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Canadian courts regularly exclude psychological expert evidence that would explain
the factors that produce mistaken eyewitness identifications and false confessions (two
significant sources of wrongful convictions). Courts justify these exclusions on the basis that
the evidence is not beyond the ken of the trier of fact—the psychologist would simply be
describing an experience shared by the judge and jury. In this article, the authors suggest
this reasoning rests on two fundamental misunderstandings of psychology: unconscious
neglect and dispositionism. In other words, judges mistakenly assume the trier of fact
understands the unconscious situational forces that distort memories and cause innocent
people to confess. Moreover, judges appear to prefer dispositional evidence of some disorder
or syndrome suffered by the accused or by the witness to the crime. After demonstrating
evidence of such reasoning in several decisions, the authors suggest reforms based on a
more nuanced understanding of human psychology.
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Outside consciousness there rolls a vast tide of life, which is, perhaps, even more
important to us than the little isle of our thoughts which lies within our ken.1
CANADA, LIKE MANY JURISDICTIONS, relies on a “beyond the ken” standard

to determine if expert evidence is necessary, and thus admissible, in court.2
In other words, expert evidence may only be admitted if it is likely to be outside
the experience of the trier of fact. Fields like forensic science and pathology
usually meet this standard, and, thus, experts in these fields regularly appear in
court. However, psychological scientists—apart from some clinicians—face a

1.
2.

E S Dallas, The Gay Science (London: Chapman and Hall, 1866) at 207, cited in Timothy
D Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) at 17.
R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9 at 23, 114 DLR (4th) 419 [Mohan]. In the United States, the
Federal Rules of Evidence overturned the common law beyond the ken standard. However,
David Kaye and colleagues note that “many—perhaps most” US courts continue to apply
the old common law rule. See David H Kaye, David E Bernstein & Jennifer L Mnookin,
The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence - Expert Evidence, 2nd ed, Richard D Friedman,
ed (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011) at 39. Similarly, in Australia, the Uniform Evidence
Law abolished the requirement that opinion evidence go beyond common knowledge.
For an example of this in New South Wales, see Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 80(b). Still,
common law states retain the beyond common knowledge requirement and regularly exclude
psychological scientific evidence on that basis. See R v LM, [2004] QCA 192. And, as in the
United States, even states that have adopted the Uniform Evidence Law still retain the
common knowledge distinction to some extent. See J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 10th ed
(Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015) at 237-39, 1018-24.
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good deal more difficulty.3 This tendency has received a considerable amount
of academic criticism because these psychologists would often opine on
psychological phenomena that contribute to wrongful convictions, especially
eyewitness memory and false confessions.4 Our contribution to this field, which
forms the subject matter of this article, is an explanation for why judges tend
to find that psychological science is within the trier of fact’s ken and why that
decision is mistaken.
In determining whether evidence is beyond the ken, courts fall prey to two
fundamental misunderstandings about human psychology. First, they neglect
the unconscious processes5 that underlie our behaviours and emotions. Second,
courts discount the power of the situation in favour of a dispositional model
of human psychology. As a result, judges regularly exclude experts because of
the assumption that jurors are fully equipped to understand those unconscious
and situational forces. They reason that those psychological forces form part of
the everyday human experience, and, thus, jurors already know all they need to
know. But, as E.S. Dallas noted in the above quotation that opened this article,
this approach wrongly restricts jurors’ view of human nature to that which is
within our conscious ken. To take an example from the eyewitness memory field,
the leading Canadian judgment drew a strict line between evidence about the
situational forces that cause misremembering and disorders, like autism, that

3.

4.

5.

For a review, see David M Paciocco, “Coping with Expert Evidence About Human
Behaviour” (1999) 25:1 Queen’s LJ 305; Gary T Trotter, “False Confessions and Wrongful
Convictions” (2003-2004) 35:2 Ottawa L Rev 179; Timothy E Moore & Cindy R Wasser,
“Social Science and Witness Reliability: Reliable Science Begets Reliable Evidence” (2006) 33
CR (6th); Jill Copeland, “Helping Jurors Recognize the Frailties of Eyewitness Identification
Evidence” (2002) 46:2 Crim LQ 188; Lisa Dufraimont, “Regulating Unreliable Evidence:
Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?” (2008) 33:2 Queen’s
LJ 261; Emma Cunliffe, “Without fear or favour? Trends and possibilities in the Canadian
approach to expert human behaviour evidence” (2006) 10:4 Intl J Evidence & Proof 280.
Copeland, supra note 3; Trotter, supra note 3 at 193; Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 312,
321-26; Amy D Trenary, “State v. Henderson: A Model for Admitting Eyewitness
Identification Testimony” (2013) 84:4 U Colo L Rev 1257.
Compare Lee Stuesser, “Experts on Eyewitness Identification: I Just Don’t See It” (2006) 31:3
Man LJ 543 (for an argument that psychological scientific evidence is unnecessary).
In using the term unconscious, we are referring to the concept as it has been explored in
decades of cognitive scientific research on mental processes that evade conscious reflection.
This conception contrasts with the lay (and Freudian) meaning of the word often associated
with sublimated desires.
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impact memory.6 The situational evidence is inadmissible because all jurors have
memories and all have experienced forgetting.7 Disposition is admissible because
most jurors have not experienced autism.8
This approach represents a facile and incorrect view of psychology. Rather,
humans cannot report on what the unconscious parts of their brains are up to
and are, in fact, oblivious to those processes. For similar reasons, they are often
unaware of the situational forces that profoundly impact their lives. As hundreds
of wrongful convictions demonstrate, people do not naturally think like
psychological scientists and, thus, require assistance in evaluating testimony that
engages well-established and replicated psychological findings. We now define
these two misunderstandings of human psychology—unconscious neglect and
dispositionism—prior to providing an outline for this article.
Several decades of psychology research have converged on two truths that
have been largely disregarded by conventional legal reasoning.9 First, a great deal
of our thoughts, feelings, and behaviours are driven by unconscious processes
that we cannot consciously access. And so, when we are asked to report on why
we came to a certain judgment, we often confabulate reasons. Investigation
into these processes has girded Nobel Prize-winning research on how economic
markets work10 and has found that they are driven by unconscious heuristics
that even leading academics long disregarded.11 For ease of reading, we refer

6.

R v McIntosh (1997), 35 OR (3d) 97 at para 21, 117 CCC (3d) 385 (CA) [McIntosh].
The court notes: “Expert evidence might be admissible to show that the witness is an
autistic savant and that such exceptional memory feats are often associated with this
syndrome” (ibid).
7. Ibid at para 20.
8. Ibid at para 21.
9. For a review of research that has sought to integrate social and cognitive psychology into
legal scholarship, see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, “The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture” (2003) 152:1
U Pa L Rev 129 [Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situation”]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, “The
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal” (2004) 93:1 Geo
LJ 1 [Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character”].
10. More recently, this research yielded important legal policy suggestions in the form of what
researchers term “nudges.” See Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). This
research formed the basis of the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economics awarded to Thaler.
11. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”
(1979) 47:2 Econometrica 263.
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to this failure to account for unconscious cognitive and affective processes as
“unconscious neglect.”12
Second, most people fail to account for the psychological influence of
situational forces and overestimate the role of disposition (psychologists know
this phenomenon as the “fundamental attribution error”).13 In social and
cognitive psychology, which has produced much of the research described herein,
situational forces include demands that come from outside the individual, such
as features of the environment and the presence or absence of other people.
Disposition, on the other hand, comes from within. It encompasses personality
characteristics14 and the presence of a psychological disorder.15
Thought, action, and emotion are, of course, driven by a complex interaction
of situation and disposition: Certain types of people seek out certain types of
situations, and, conversely, situational demands shape our personalities. But in any
given instance, the role of situation or disposition may be isolated through careful
empirical and experimental research. And, as we detail below in Part I, humans
intuitively favour dispositional accounts of psychology.16 Indeed, situationism—

12. In coining this term, we were inspired by Daniel T Gilbert and colleagues’ term “immune
neglect,” which represents the failure to account for unconscious processes that stabilize
our emotions. See Daniel T Gilbert et al, “Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting” (1998) 75:3 J Personality & Soc Psychol 617.
13. See e.g. Lee Ross & Richard E Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social
Psychology (London, UK: Pinter & Martin, 2011); Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational
Character,” supra note 9 at 6-13. One well-studied instance of the fundamental attribution
error is the inclination to attribute one’s personal failings to some situational factor but
attribute others’ personal failings to their disposition. See Elliot Aronson, Timothy D Wilson
& Robin M Akert, Social Psychology, 4th ed (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002) at 114-27.
On the actor/observer difference, see also Edward E Jones & Richard E Nisbett, “The Actor
and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behaviour” in Edward E Jones
et al, Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (New Jersey: General Learning Press,
1972) at 79-94.
14. See generally Hans J Eysenck & Michael W Eysenck, Personality and Individual Differences:
A Natural Science Approach (New York: Plenum, 1985).
15. The study of mental disorders is typically conducted by clinical psychologists. For a
methodological review of that field, see Jennifer L Tackett et al, “It’s Time to Broaden the
Replicability Conversation: Thoughts for and from Clinical Psychological Science” (2017)
12:5 Perspectives on Psychol Sci 742.
16. Ross & Nisbett, supra note 13; Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9.
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recognition of the power of the situation—has only just begun to inform legal
scholarship, with evidence law largely insulated from this perspective.17
As we discuss, experts may be proffered to explain the situational and
unconscious factors that cause eyewitnesses to make mistakes18 and cause
suspects to falsely confess to crimes.19 The decision to admit or exclude these
experts carries serious stakes. Mistaken eyewitness identifications are present in
approximately 70–80 per cent of wrongful convictions,20 and false confessions
are also surprisingly common.21 A better understanding of why courts deem
these experts unnecessary is vital to charting a path forward in preventing
wrongful convictions.
Now that we have set up the problem, Part I delves into the science
of unconscious neglect and dispositionism. That background provides the
foundation for Part II, wherein we discuss the influence of those forces on expert
evidence doctrine. We focus on the psychology of eyewitness memory and false
confessions for their criminal justice implications and demonstrable role in
wrongful convictions. Finally, in Parts III and IV, we suggest a more flexible and
concerted approach to unreliable Crown evidence that melds both exclusionary
rules as well as measures designed to disabuse fact-finders of the misconceptions
that flow from unconscious neglect and dispositionism.

17. In a review of the legal literature, Hanson and Yosifon remark that “[a]s a general matter,
lay theories of human behavior, as well as legal theories, recognize the role of situation only
when it is palpable or when theorists are particularly motivated to do so” (ibid at 6). Still,
there is some acknowledgement of the role of the situation in evidence law. For instance,
Justice Rosenberg, in R v Clarke, discussed the probative value of character evidence through
the lens of situationism. He found (correctly, in our view) that both situation and disposition
inform behaviour. See R v Clarke (1998), 129 CCC (3d) 1 at para 26, 112 OAC 233. Note
also that Justice Rosenberg struck a situationist tone later in the judgment when he said that
the jury should be told that a reputation for lying may not be predictive of perjury because
“testifying in court under oath is a very different circumstance” (ibid at para 55).
18. David L Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, “Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony” (2014) 81:2 U Chicago L Rev 417 at 432-34.
19. Ibid at 467-68.
20. “Eyewitness Misidentification” (2017), The Innocence Project, online: <www.innocenceproject.
org/causes/eyewitness-misidentification>; Brandon L Garrett, “Judging Innocence” (2008)
108:1 Colum L Rev 55 at 60.
21. Brandon L Garrett, “The Substance of False Confessions” (2010) 62:4 Stan L Rev 1051
[Garrett, “Substance”].
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I. UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECT AND DISPOSITIONISM
The more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more we shall see that the
automatic, unconscious action of the mind enters largely into all its processes. Our
definite ideas are stepping-stones; how we get from one to the other, we do not
know: something carries us; we do not take the step.22

Much psychological scientific research has concentrated on a simple but
powerful finding: A lot of the time, we do not know the source of our behaviours,
feelings, and conscious thoughts. This failure of self-knowledge contributes
to dispositionism; we see behaviour as driven by internal mechanisms (i.e.,
dispositions) rather than less obvious situational forces. We correspondingly
underestimate the impact of those situational forces.
In this Part, we first discuss the new science of the unconscious. As Oliver
Wendell Holmes Sr. expressed in the above quotation, scientists have regularly
contemplated the role that the unconscious plays in shaping our feelings and
behaviours. But only in the last half-century or so have these processes received
systematic empirical study. And much more recently still have legal scholars
taken notice of these findings. We review these findings, specifically as they relate
to expert evidence law. We then discuss how a failure to account for unconscious
processes gives rise to dispositionism: discounting the role of the situation in
favour of a character-based view of human behaviour. We end this Part with
an application of these concepts to the science of eyewitness memory and
false confessions.23
A. UNCONSCIOUS VERSUS CONSCIOUS PROCESSES

Over the past several decades, psychologists have uncovered increasing evidence
about the significance and sheer amount of cognition that occurs unconsciously.
A leading account draws a dichotomy between automatic and unconscious
thinking (i.e., System 1), and conscious and controlled thinking (i.e., System
2).24 This research suggests that System 2 is just the tip of a vast iceberg of
unconscious thinking. This powerful insight flows from Nobel Prize-winning
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr, “Mechanism in Thought and Morals” (Address delivered before
the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University, 29 June 1870), cited in Hanson &
Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 32.
23. Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18 at 425-26.
24. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (London: MacMillan, 2001); Michael J Saks &
Barbara A Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law (New York: New York
University Press, 2016) at 19-22.
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work from psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose research
is well-known for its application to economic behaviour.25 They found that the
longstanding assumption of the rational economic actor was regularly violated.
Instead, subtle tweaks to the framing of an economic decision can vastly impact
judgments and decisions.26 In other words, a great deal of economic behaviour is
the product of unconscious heuristics and biases, or System 1.
A similar paradigm shift is underway in legal scholarship. For instance, Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler recently applied the power of System 1 in a program
of influence they refer to as “nudges.”27 Nudge policies rely on unconscious
processes to change behaviour without express rewards and punishments.28
For instance, making organ donation the default choice when applying for a
driver’s license dramatically increases that choice.29 Nudges do not seek to change
a person’s nature or disposition but rather subtly tweak the environment to
alter behaviour. And, in fact, nudgees are not consciously aware they are being
influenced; few, if any, of donors in the above scenario would report that they
volunteered to be an organ donor because of the way the question was worded.30
Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson, in one of the most influential studies
in psychology, added an important element to the understanding of unconscious
thought: Humans cannot verbally report on it.31 In other words, not only does
System 1 operate outside our awareness, but when we attempt to introspect as to
why we did certain things, we often end up just making it up. Along with other
experiments and a re-analysis of previous work, Nisbett and Wilson supported
this insight in a very clever way. They performed a study, guised as research,
on consumer preferences. They set up a table at a large department store with
four sets of stockings. When customers approached the table, the researchers
asked them to inspect the stockings and say which set they preferred and why.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 11.
Ibid at 265-69.
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 10.
Ibid at 5-6.
Eric J Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, “Do Defaults Save Lives?” (2003) 302:5649 Sci 1338.
The Canadian Department of Justice recently recognized unconscious bias in its new
procedures for appointing federal judges. See Canada, Department of Justice, “Changes to
the Appointments Process for Federal Judges” (20 January 2017), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/csj-sjc/scapq-pncsq.html>.
31. Richard E Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes” (1977) 84:3 Psychol Rev 231. For a review of this study in the
context of lay opinion evidence, see Jason M Chin, Jan Tomiska & Chen Li, “Drawing the
Line Between Lay and Expert Opinion Evidence” 63:1 McGill LJ [forthcoming in 2018].
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The stockings on the far right of the table were the most popular, with shoppers
saying, for instance, that they had a superior knit or simply felt the softest.
The genius of this study was that the stockings were all the same. Nisbett and
Wilson had pretested the display and found that most people, when shopping,
tend to gravitate towards items on the right. But only one of their participants
realized this (that outlier was a psychology student), and the rest confabulated
reasons for their decisions that could not be true considering these were identical
stockings. In other words, these stocking-choosers, just like the organ donors
encountering a choice framed in a subtly different way, were unconsciously
influenced and, thus, could not provide the actual reason for their decisions.
In short, we simply cannot report on what System 1 is up to.32
B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NON-INTUITIVE POWER OF THE
SITUATION

Unconscious neglect gives rise to dispositionism.33 It is because we are unaware
of the source of much of what we think and do that we fail to realize how deeply
affected we are by the situation. The organ donor, for instance, fails to realize
that a subtle tweak to the situation influenced his or her behaviour and instead
ascribes the choice to a disposition: “I am the kind of person who wants to see my
organs live on to help others.” This, as Nisbett and Wilson so lucidly demonstrate,
is a confabulation. In fact, Nisbett and Wilson’s research sits in a field that, since
its inception, has rigorously studied the situational influences that impact our
behaviours in ways we do not account for. That field is social psychology.
32. See Kahneman, supra note 24. Daniel Kahneman provides a similar description of System 1
as unverbalizable:
When you are asked what you are thinking about, you can normally answer. You believe you
know what goes on in your mind, which often consists of one conscious thought leading in
an orderly way to another. But that is not the only way the mind works, nor indeed is that the
typical way. Most impressions and thoughts arise in your conscious experience without your
knowing how they got there (ibid at 4).

See also Wilson, supra note 1. As we emphasize in the following paragraphs, it is not just
that we lack introspective access to the reasons for our actions, but we also often generate the
incorrect reasons. See infra note 58 and the accompanying text.
33. Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 32, citing Mahzarin R
Banaji, “Ordinary Prejudice” (2001) Psychological Sci Agenda 8 at 8. Banaji notes that
“[c]onsciousness, the feature at the center of what makes humans unique, is the culprit
[of our dispositionism], for it permits a view of who we are and what we are capable of
that is independent of the knowledge and feelings that may drive beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviour” (ibid).
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Social psychology arose, in part, as a reaction to World War II and the
questions it prompted about the genesis of evil deeds. In particular, were the
atrocities that were committed a product of bad people (i.e., disposition) or
powerful situational forces? Such questions were explored in what is perhaps
social psychology’s paradigmatic set of studies: Stanley Milgram’s obedience
experiments.34 Milgram asked participants to give gradually increasing shocks
to another participant (an employee of Milgram’s lab who was not actually
being shocked). The presumed shock recipient would protest, saying he had a
heart condition, and even scream out towards the end. The device used by the
participants contained multiple warnings that the shocks were dangerous. Still,
the experimenter, cloaked in a white lab coat, urged the participants on, saying
that they must finish the experiment. About 65 per cent gave the maximum shock
voltage—a clear demonstration of the power of the situation.35
In a lesser-known component of Milgram’s research program, he asked other
participants to read about the study and its results and predict how they would
have behaved had they been subjected to the experiment.36 These participants,
who were fully aware of the profound impact of the situation, still underestimated
it; most said they would have stopped the shocks.37 They could not override
their dispositionist tendency to believe that they were not the type of people to
administer the apparently lethal shock.
The pressure to obey falls into a category of especially strong situational
stressors termed “visceral factors” by George Loewenstein.38 Visceral factors
(e.g., hunger, pain, and sexual desire) produce a direct hedonic impact on the
individual and are thus incredibly powerful in causing short-term behavioural
change. And, because they lie deep in System 1, people “underweigh, or even
ignore, visceral factors that they will experience in the future, have experienced
in the past, or that are experienced by other people.”39

34. Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience” (1963) 67:4 J Abnormal &
Soc Psychol 371.
35. Ibid at 372, 376.
36. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row,
1974) [Milgram, Obedience]; George Loewenstein, “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on
Behavior” (1996) 65:3 Organizational Behaviour & Hum Decision Processes 272 at 282.
37. Milgram, Obedience, supra note 36 at 27-31.
38. Loewenstein, supra note 36.
39. Ibid at 272.
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Loewenstein applied this failure to account for visceral factors to explain
several longstanding psychological paradoxes.40 On the more mundane end,
people seem perpetually overconfident in their ability to wake up early because
they are unable to simulate the hedonic averseness of a 5:00 a.m. wakeup call.41
And, more importantly, hedonic factors explain research on outbreaks of sexually
transmitted infections which occur because “much unprotected sex occurs in
the heat of the moment but that people can’t remember or predict what the
heat felt like and so are unprepared to deal with it.”42 In short, these hedonic
forces are automatic and unconscious, and thus difficult to account for, both in
ourselves and others.
C. APPLIED SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY ON EYEWITNESS
MEMORY AND FALSE CONFESSIONS

When it comes to the study of wrongful convictions, perhaps the most important
development to come from social and cognitive psychology is research on
eyewitness memory and false confessions. We address these topics in order.
That eyewitnesses can make identification errors is a well-documented
phenomenon in the justice system. Psychologists have spent decades investigating
the causes of such high-stakes errors, focusing on phenomena that fall within
the realm of cognitive psychology (those affecting our memorial and attentional
processes) and social psychology (those that result from interaction between
two or more people).43 This research has been referred to as the “gold standard”
of psychological research applied to the legal context.44 Many of the experiments
that have established the causes of eyewitness misidentification have arisen from
real-life cases.
Take the well-known case of Ronald Cotton’s wrongful conviction in the
United States. 45 When an African-American male broke into Jennifer Thompson’s
40. On issues with underuse of contraception and self-protection against sexually transmitted
infections, see e.g. ibid at 286-89. See also Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, “The Heat of
the Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making” (2006) 19:2 J Behav
Decision Making 87.
41. Loewenstein, supra note 36 at 281.
42. Ibid at 286.
43. For a review, see United States, National Research Council, Committee on Science,
Technology, and Law, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2014).
44. State v Henderson, 208 NJ 208 (2011) [State v Henderson], citing State v Chun, 194 NJ 54
(2008). See also Saks & Spellman, supra note 24 at 26.
45. Jennifer Thompson-Cannino, Ronald Cotton & Erin Torneo, Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of
Injustice and Redemption (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009).
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college apartment and sexually assaulted her, Thompson made sure to study her
attacker’s face in order to make an identification. Later, Thompson carefully
examined a photograph lineup and picked the one she thought looked most like
her attacker. She chose Cotton’s photograph. Afterward, the police did a live line
up, and, again, Thompson chose Cotton. She was confident she recognized him.
At trial, Thompson was completely confident that she recognized Cotton as her
attacker. This confidence was misplaced. In fact, Thompson incorrectly identified
Cotton and failed to recognize Bobby Poole, the actual attacker as established
by post-conviction DNA testing.46 In retrospect, several questions arise from
Cotton’s wrongful conviction. How could Thompson so confidently misidentify
her attacker after studying his face so carefully? How could she fail to identify
Poole, her actual attacker? Psychological science offers answers to these questions:
a combination of unconscious and situational factors that, unfortunately, can
influence anyone.
Memory’s key vulnerability is that it is reconstructive. This means that
instead of keeping an accurate recording of information about what has happened
to us, we instead piece memory fragments together with suggestion from the
environment. In turn, we are all vulnerable to a wide variety of memory errors
and distortions. Jennifer Thompson exhibited one such memory error by picking
Cotton out of the live lineup at the station and again at trial, a phenomenon
called “unconscious transference.”47 Put another way, Jennifer Thompson did
recognize Ronald Cotton when she saw him in the live lineup because she had
seen him before in the photograph lineup and mistakenly believed she recognized
him from the attack.48 As we shall discuss below, identifying such transference
in cross-examination is difficult (and perhaps impossible) because the witness
is unaware that it occurred. Indeed, psychologists have demonstrated across a
multitude of studies that unconscious transference can result in innocent people
being mistaken for the actual perpetrator.49
Memory-distorting, post-event information can be introduced by talking
about an event as well. In a ground-breaking study by Elizabeth Loftus and
colleagues, participants viewed a series of photographs depicting an automobile–
46. Ibid at 213.
47. David F Ross et al, “Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity: When a Witness
Misidentifies a Familiar but Innocent Person” (1994) 79:6 J Applied Psychol 918.
48. Thompson-Cannino, Cotton & Torneo, supra note 45.
49. Elizabeth F Loftus, “Unconscious Transference in Eyewitness Identification” (1976) 2:1
Law & Psychol Rev 93; Kenneth A Deffenbacher, Brian H Bornstein & Steven D Penrod,
“Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source
Confusion, and Unconscious Transference” (2006) 30:3 Law & Hum Behavior 287.
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pedestrian accident and then answered questions about what they remembered.50
Some of the questions contained misleading information; the experimenters,
for example, asked: “Did another car pass the red Datsun while it was sitting
at the stop sign?” when the red Datsun was actually sitting at a yield sign.51
Later, the researchers asked what type of traffic sign the red Datsun was waiting
at—a yield sign or a stop sign. Instead of noticing the incorrect information
(that the sign was a stop sign), participants incorporated it into their memory
for the event. When asked what the traffic sign was, many participants answered:
“a stop sign,” when they actually saw a yield sign. Over the years, many other
psychologists have studied this “misinformation effect” and found it to be robust
and generalizable.52
Beyond our tendency to form and maintain inaccurate memories, the manner
in which our memories are tested can dictate how we respond. As such, it should
come as no surprise that psychologists have investigated how photograph and live
lineups can lead to better or worse eyewitness identifications. Any such factors are
categorized as either estimator variables or system variables.53 Estimator variables
refer to situational and dispositional factors that may influence eyewitness
memory, including normal memory processes such as decay, stress, or cross-racial
identification impairment.54 They are outside the control of investigators. System
variables, on the other hand, refer to factors (often situational) that investigators
can control, such as the lineup design or administration. If we think of eyewitness
identifications as real-world memory tests, then we want to ensure that an
eyewitness “passes”—that is, makes the correct identification. To do this, we want
to make sure the test is well-designed by ensuring that the witness makes the
correct identification based on their memory for what they saw, and make sure
the test is administered fairly by ensuring that the investigator does not influence

50. Elizabeth F Loftus, David G Miller & Helen J Burns, “Semantic Integration of
Verbal Information into a Visual Memory” (1978) 4:1 J Experimental Psychol: Hum
Learning & Memory 19.
51. Ibid at 20.
52. For a review, see Elizabeth F Loftus, “Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year
investigation of the malleability of memory” (2005) 12:4 Learning & Memory 361.
53. Brian L Cutler, Steven D Penrod & Todd K Martens, “The reliability of eyewitness
identification: The role of system and estimator variables” (1987) 11:3 Law &
Hum Behavior 233.
54. See Kenneth A Deffenbacher et al, “A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress
on Eyewitness Memory” (2004) 28:6 Law & Hum Behavior 687; Christian A Meissner &
John C Brigham, “Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces:
A Meta-Analytic Review” (2001) 7:1 Psychol Pub Pol’y & L 3.
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the answer in any way. In other words, the situational–contextual factors that
may bias the identification should be minimized.
Like with those participants in Milgram’s study, who read the results but
failed to grasp the consequences, the situational and unconscious nature of
memory has also resulted in demonstrable myths. For example, in a recent
nationally representative survey of Americans, Daniel Simons and Christopher
Chabris found that many respondents still endorsed incorrect beliefs about
human memory.55 For example, 63 per cent endorsed the view that memory
works like a video camera, 78 per cent thought that hypnosis enhances memory,
and 48 per cent believed that memory is permanent (i.e., that the content of the
memory does not change over time). The pervasion of such myths is extremely
troubling because there is decades of scientific research disproving each of these.
While it may be tempting to conclude that “mistakes happen,” and that the
structure of the justice system attempts to correct for such mistakes, it is remarkably
troubling that we are rarely able to account for our own errors. Indeed, Jennifer
Thompson was completely confident about her inaccurate memory of her attacker,
to the point where she failed to recognize the real assailant. Psychologists have
long investigated whether we can evaluate memories to detect whether they are
true or false. Generally speaking, we are unable to tell the difference between our
own true and false memories.56 Further, observers—even expert psychologists—
cannot say if a particular memory is accurate or inaccurate.57 As such, a full
understanding of what dispositional and situational factors may lead to memory
distortion is extremely important for legal decision making.
The lack of observability of memory does not mean that people will always
misunderstand how their memories work. Rather, misunderstanding is most
likely to occur when naïve psychological theories (held by the general public) run
counter to reality.58 For instance, some memory phenomena may be intuitive (e.g.,
poor lighting impairs memory formation) and, in some cases, anecdotal experience
55. Daniel J Simons & Christopher F Chabris, “What People Believe about How Memory
Works: A Representative Survey of the U.S. Population” (2011) 6:8 PLoS ONE e22757.
56. Alan Scoboria et al, “A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false
memory implantation studies” (2017) 25:2 Memory 146.
57. Daniel M Bernstein & Elizabeth F Loftus, “How to Tell If a Particular Memory Is True or
False” (2009) 4:4 Persp on Psychological Sci 370; Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra
note 18 at 432-34.
58. Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 31 at 233 (calling these “a priori theories about the causal
connection between stimulus and response” (ibid)). See also Donald G Dutton & Arthur P
Aron, “Some Evidence for Heightened Sexual Attraction Under Conditions of High Anxiety”
(1974) 30:4 J Personality & Soc Psychol 510.
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may be representative of actual memory operation (e.g., some individuals may be
able to call to mind instances in which they observed something while under
great stress and then failed to recall it later). However, lay psychology is often
wrong. Recall, for instance, the stocking-choosers in Nisbett and Wilson’s study
who assumed their preferences were driven by the quality of the product rather
than its position. Similarly, intuitions about how our memories work will often
be wrong; we cannot directly examine these unconscious processes.59
Confessions are another form of evidence for which psychological science
provides a more complete understanding. Once again, findings in this area
are often counterintuitive. Despite the expectation that an innocent person
would never confess to a crime he or she did not commit, lab studies contradict
this intuition. In a 1996 study, Saul Kassin and Katherine Kiechel recruited
participants to complete a seemingly mundane typing task with a partner.60 There
was one rule: do not press the “Alt” key on the keyboard, or the computer would
crash and data would be lost. Unbeknownst to the participants, the computer
was designed to crash after several minutes of typing. When the experimenter
accused the participants of pressing the key, the majority of participants, feeling
the pressure of the situation, agreed to sign a statement acknowledging their guilt
(i.e., a confession).
While such laboratory settings are qualitatively different than actual police
interrogations, variations on the Kassin and Kiechel paradigm have shown that
people continue to confess falsely when the experimental realism is increased,

59. See Tanja Rapus Benton et al, “Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing
Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts” (2006) 20:1 Applied Cognitive
Psychol 115. These researchers presented eyewitness experts, jurors, and judges with thirty
system and estimator variables that influence eyewitness memory and asked participants to
rate whether the statements were “generally true,” “generally false,” or to state “I don’t know.”
Experts, jurors, and judges showed high agreement for some estimator and system variable
factors. For example, the majority of all three groups said that the wording of questions
(situational), child suggestibility (dispositional), and alcoholic intoxication (situational) all
affect eyewitness memory. Overall, however, jurors significantly disagreed with experts on 87
per cent of the issues, and judges significantly disagreed with experts on 60 per cent of the
issues. This study illustrates that properly accounting for the dispositional and situational
factors in eyewitness memory is difficult and likely exists on a continuum of understanding.
While some jurors and judges may agree with knowledgeable experts, there is a large amount
of variation across factors, which underlines the importance of not relying on our own
assessment of our knowledge.
60. Saul M Kassin & Katherine L Kiechel, “The Social Psychology of False Confessions:
Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation” (1996) 7:3 Psychological Sci 125.
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for example, by imposing consequences for confessing.61 In fact, it stands to
reason that if people confess to researchers in a laboratory, real life situations,
in which suspects have more at stake, are under great stress, and are the subject
of hours-long police interrogations, only increase the pressure on an innocent
person to confess.
Although a number of dispositional factors put someone at risk for a false
confession (such as certain clinical diagnoses, youth, and low IQ),62 there also
numerous situational factors that do so. For example, investigators can induce
false confessions with a variety of interrogation techniques, such as offering
(false) inculpatory evidence,63 refusing to accept denials,64 or implying leniency
for confessing.65 Beyond that, though, the tenets of social psychology predict
(and indeed have been supported by research) that people will falsely confess
for more simple reasons, such as a basic decision-making task of avoiding the
immediate, unpleasant situation of an interrogation, without considering the
ramifications of confessing.66 To summarize, people do falsely confess to crimes,
and many of the reasons people do so are situational in nature.

II. UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECT AND DISPOSITIONISM IN
EXPERT EVIDENCE LAW
As a general matter, lay theories of human behavior, as well as legal theories, recognize
the role of the situation only when it is palpable or when theorists are particularly
motivated to do so. And even then, only the most salient or satisfying elements of
the situation are considered. Otherwise, disposition is presumed to govern.67

61. See e.g. Robert Horselenberg, Harald Merckelbach & Sarah Josephs, “Individual Differences
and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel” (1996) 9:1
Psychol Crime & Law 1; Allison D Redlich & Gail S Goodman, “Taking Responsibility
for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility” (2003) 27:2 Law &
Hum Behavior 141.
62. Saul M Kassin et al, “Police-Induced Confessions, Risk Factors and Recommendations”
(2010) 34:1 Law & Hum Behavior 3 [Kassin et al, “Police”]; Lindsay C Malloy, Elizabeth P
Shulman & Elizabeth Cauffman, “Interrogations, confessions, and guilty pleas among serious
adolescent offenders” (2014) 38:2 Law & Hum Behavior 181.
63. Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 60.
64. Kassin et al, “Police,” supra note 62.
65. Melissa B Russano et al, “Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel
Experimental Paradigm” (2005) 16:6 Psychological Sci 481.
66. Kassin et al, “Police,” supra note 62 at 14.
67. Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 6.

Chin, Crozier, Rethinking the Ken 641

A growing number of legal scholars have come to recognize the power of
the situation and have begun to integrate it into modern legal thought.68 These
scholars have remarked that traditional patterns of legal scholarship tend to
parallel patterns of human thought, which are intuitively dispositionist and
neglectful of the unconscious.69 Expert evidence law should not be exempted
from this analysis. Shunning situationism in evidence law for a more cognitively
facile model of human behaviour comes at a terrible cost: People are put in jail
(or worse) when they do not belong there, and the real perpetrators are free
to do more harm.
Under the beyond the ken standard, scientific evidence must be “likely
to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury”70 in order to
be admissible in court. In Canada, this requirement is incorporated into R v
Mohan’s criterion that the evidence be “necessary to enable the trier of fact.”71
This requirement typically proves insurmountable for experts seeking to opine
about eyewitness memory and false confessions, unless they couch their opinion
in some disposition the accused possesses.72 As we describe above in Part I,
characterizing these expert opinions as within the ken reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of science.
In this Part, we examine Canadian eyewitness memory and false confessions
jurisprudence. In this jurisprudence, we identify a dispositionist thread. Prior to
that, however, it is instructive to consider “[t]he high-tide mark in the Supreme
68. See e.g. ibid; Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situation,” supra note 9; Thaler &
Sunstein, supra note 10.
69. Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 6.
70. Mohan, supra note 2 at 23; See also Sidney N Lederman, Alan W Bryant & Michelle K
Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at
795-99. See also the discussion at supra note 2.
71. Mohan, supra note 2 at 23, citing R v Abbey, [1982] 2 SCR 24 at para 44, 138 DLR
(3d) 202. See also R v D(D), 2000 SCC 43 at paras 21, 57, [2000] 2 SCR 275 [D(D)];
R v K(A) (1999), 45 OR (3d) 641 at paras 90-92, 176 DLR (4th) 665 (CA). For a review,
see Cunliffe, supra note 3 at 299-302. Besides necessity, expert evidence must also meet
three other preconditions. It must be logically relevant, not be subject to other exclusionary
rules, and be proffered by a properly qualified expert (with a threshold level of impartiality).
Novel or contested scientific evidence must also possess a threshold level of reliability.
Evidence that passes that threshold is then subjected to the trial judge’s residual discretion
to exclude evidence when its costs (e.g., time, prejudice) to the trial process outweigh its
benefits. Reliability and impartiality are factored into this discretionary weighing. For a more
thorough summary, see White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co, 2015 SCC
23 at paras 23-24, [2015] 2 SCR 182 [White Burgess].
72. McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 20; R v Pearce, 2014 MBCA 70 at paras 89, 95, 310 Man R
(2d) 14 [Pearce].
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Court of Canada’s liberal approach to the admissibility of expert evidence”:73 the
admission of Battered Woman Syndrome (“BWS”)74 evidence in R v Lavallee.75
BWS provides a useful counterpoint to similar psychological evidence that is
excluded because it rests firmly on a disposition—a syndrome—rather than on
situational factors. Expert evidence about BWS is usually proffered to support
self-defence claims of women who kill their partners in the context of a long
pattern of domestic violence. We suggest that BWS has found success at the
admission stage—whereas similar evidence has not—because it fits with the
courts’ dispositionist instincts. But, as some jurists have noted,76 restricting such
evidence to a disposition may unduly constrain self-defence claims.
The accused in Lavallee shot and killed her perpetually abusive husband.77
She pleaded self-defence with BWS supporting the reasonableness and necessity
of her actions.78 As the name suggests, BWS can result from physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse against the female partner in a close relationship. It is associated
with a feeling of learned helplessness, from which the battered woman perceives
a lack of alternatives to remaining in the abusive relationship.79 In Lavallee,
the defence witness, a psychiatrist, explained why the accused, as a sufferer of
BWS, might stay in a relationship with an abusive partner and why she might be
particularly wary of severe and imminent violence.80 The psychiatrist’s evidence
demonstrated why it would be reasonable for the accused to believe her life was at
risk in a way that would not have been apparent to an outside observer.81
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) rejected the Crown’s argument that
the psychiatrist’s evidence was unnecessary for dealing with a subject that was
within the ken of the judge and jury.82 Justice Wilson, writing for the Court,
noted that there is a belief—one that the Crown sought to take advantage
of—that judges do not need expert psychological evidence because they are
73. Cunliffe, supra note 3 at 292.
74. Battered Woman Syndrome is now often referred to as Battered Spouse Syndrome or
Battered Partner Syndrome in the research literature. We use the first term to reflect its use in
the primary case we consider: R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852, 67 Man R (2d) 1 [Lavallee].
See Martha Shaffer, “The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some Complicating
Thoughts Five Years After R. v. Lavallee” (1997) 47:1 UTLJ 1.
75. Lavallee, supra note 74.
76. See infra note 87 and the accompanying text.
77. Lavallee, supra note 74 at paras 2-11.
78. Ibid at paras 26-27.
79. Ibid at para 58.
80. Ibid at paras 41-52.
81. Ibid at paras 45-74.
82. Ibid at paras 32-40.
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“thoroughly knowledgeable about ‘human nature’ and that no more is needed.
They are, so to speak, their own experts on human behaviour.”83 She found
that such confidence in the trier of fact’s understanding of human nature was
misguided. Rather, myths and stereotypes pervade the topic of domestic abuse;
judges and juries might reason that the battered woman should simply leave
the abusive relationship. As a result, an expert was necessary to understand the
mental state of a battered woman in the case of Lavallee.
Evidence about BWS is now frequently admitted by courts in Canada,84
the United States,85 and Australia.86 But BWS presents a dispositional view of a
situation’s (i.e., domestic violence) impact. In other words, BWS is a psychological
condition, something internal to the sufferer that guides her actions. In many
cases, it may fail to capture the full range of situations that deeply impact a person’s
behaviour. Indeed, eight years after Lavallee (in a case in which the admissibility
of BWS was conceded), Justice L’Heureux-Dubé expressed concern that this
syndromization of domestic violence could ultimately undermine self-defence
claims: “It is possible that those women who are unable to fit themselves within
the stereotype of a victimized, passive, helpless, dependent, battered woman will
not have their claims to self-defence fairly decided.”87

83. Ibid at para 33.
84. R v Kahypeasewat, 2006 SKPC 79, 284 Sask R 55; R v Young, 2008 BCCA 393, 260 BCAC
166; R v M(MA), [1998] 1 SCR 123, 155 DLR (4th) 513 [M(MA)]. Tellingly, a discussion
of BWS can often save expert evidence that would otherwise not meet the necessity standard.
For instance, parties often struggle to admit evidence explaining why a complainant
or witness delayed in reporting abuse. See D(D), supra note 71. But similar evidence
is admissible when couched in BWS. See R v Reid (2003), 65 OR (3d) 723 at para 46,
18 CR (6th) 350 (CA) [Reid]. Justice Moldaver notes: “In my view, Dr. Jaffe’s evidence was
admissible but only for a limited purpose. It should have been restricted to a brief description
of the nature and root causes of the conditions known as Battered Women’s Syndrome and
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and their possible effects on disclosure patterns.” For similar
reasoning, see R v F(DS) (1999), 43 OR (3d) 609, 169 DLR (4th) 639 (CA) [F(DS)];
R v M(RC) (2005), 67 WCB (2d) 499, 2005 CarswellOnt 4901 (WL Can) (Sup Ct);
R v S(JP) (2001), 50 WCB (2d) 161, 2001 CarswellOnt 1794 (WL Can) (CA) [S(JP)].
85. For a review, see Kaye, Bernstein & Mnookin, supra note 2 at 157-64.
86. See Heather Douglas, “Social Framework Evidence: Its Interpretation and Application in
Victoria and Beyond” in Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Arie Freiberg, eds, Homicide Law Reform in
Victoria: Retrospect and Prospects (Sydney: Federation Press, 2015) 94; Australia, National
Domestic and Family Violence Benchbook (2017), online: <dfvbenchbook.aija.org.au>.
87. M(MA), supra note 84 at para 40. See also Shaffer, supra note 74.
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It is important to note that, in many cases, the expert is not providing a
diagnosis of BWS.88 Rather, the expert is giving framework evidence;89 he or she
is explaining how BWS works, rather than saying, with some degree of medical
certainty, that the accused is suffering from BWS. The same can be said for expert
evidence about eyewitness memory and false confessions, for which experts
do not seek to opine that a witness misremembered or that an accused falsely
confessed. Rather, they explain the psychological processes, relevant to the current
case, that give rise to those phenomena. But, as we argue in the following two
sections, these experts are almost always excluded because there is no eyewitness
misidentification or false confession syndrome.
D. EYEWITNESS MEMORY

The question of admitting or excluding expert evidence about eyewitness memory
starts—and usually ends—with the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in R v
McIntosh.90 The Crown’s case in McIntosh primarily consisted of three eyewitnesses.
These witnesses identified the accused individuals as the perpetrators of a violent
robbery at a dry-cleaning business. At trial, the defendants sought to tender the
evidence of Dr. Daniel Yarmey, a cognitive psychologist specializing in memory.
Dr. Yarmey would have opined on several aspects of the identifications. These
included: limitations of eyewitnesses’ ability to view and encode the faces of the
defendants, lower accuracy related to cross-racial identification,91 the photograph
lineup used by the police, misconceptions jurors may have about photograph
lineups, difficulties with “in-dock”92 identifications, and the investigating officers’
compliance with police procedures for identifications.93
In finding the expert evidence unnecessary, Justice Finlayson characterized
the science as common sense and simply the “normal experience” of a trier of
88. See e.g. Reid, supra note 84 at para 46; S(JP), supra note 84 at para 5; F(DS), supra note 84 at
para 36. In Australia, see Douglas, supra note 86.
89. For a lucid description of the distinction between framework and diagnostic evidence, see
Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18.
90. McIntosh, supra note 6. McIntosh has been widely followed to exclude both evidence of
memory experts and confessions experts. See R v Frimpong, 2013 ONCA 243, 106 WCB
(2d) 326 [Frimpong]. On confessions experts, see Pearce, supra note 72; R v Jeanvenne, 2011
ONSC 7244 at para 27, 102 WCB (2d) 322 [Jeanvenne].
91. The defendants in McIntosh were Black, and of the eyewitnesses, one was also Black, one was
East Asian, and one was Caucasian. See McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 27.
92. In-dock identifications are those made in court. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v
Hibbert confirmed such identifications are almost completely devoid of probative value. See
R v Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39, [2002] 2 SCR 445 [Hibbert].
93. McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 11.
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fact.94 Indeed, we all have memories and we all have experienced forgetting.95
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Finlayson drew an express distinction
between inadmissible situational (and unconscious) effects on memory and
admissible dispositional characteristics suggesting “that it would be a different
situation if a Crown witness had demonstrated remarkable memory … expert
evidence might be admissible to show that the witness is an autistic savant and
that such exceptional memory feats are often associated with this syndrome.”96
The problem with the reasoning in McIntosh is that memory is not part of our
normal conscious experience.97 Rather, memory processes are unconscious and thus
unobservable. As we describe above in Part I, the best way to reliably research these
processes is to conduct randomized studies that manipulate one variable (e.g., the
race of the faces to be remembered), and then to observe the resulting effects
without directly peering into the black box of the participant’s mind. Cognitive
psychologists have performed these studies and can inform the trier of fact about
94. Ibid at para 20.
95. This view has received some academic support. See Stuesser, supra note 4 at 545 (noting “I
suggest that much of what is provided by the experts is intuitive”).
96. McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 21. As we discuss in the following paragraphs, McIntosh
is the leading case on eyewitness expertise and almost always operates to exclude such
evidence. Justice Finlayson’s situation–disposition distinction is rarely relied on, likely
because eyewitnesses do not often demonstrate psychological disorders (i.e., disposition).
But see R v M(B) (1998), 42 OR (3d) 1 at paras 100-101, 40 WCB (2d) 116 (CA). The
Court of Appeal for Ontario noted that an expert’s testimony about situational factors was
inadmissible, except to the extent that it interacted with the fact that the witness was a child
(a dispositional variable):
Some of Dr. Bray’s testimony was of a similar nature and properly excluded by the trial judge
such as her evidence about the effect of trauma on memory. However, other parts of her
evidence, especially about very early childhood memory of sexual abuse, are outside the normal
experience of the trier of fact (ibid at para 101).

More generally, our point is that both judges and juries are likely to misunderstand how
memory processes work because those processes are not directly observable. In many cases,
this will lead to them undervaluing the role of situational forces, as we describe in this Part.
97. For a similar argument, see Jennifer L Mnookin, “Constructing Evidence and Educating
Juries: The Case for Modular, Made-In-Advance Expert Evidence About Eyewitness
Identifications and False Confessions” (2015) 93:7 Tex L Rev 1811 at 1839:
The serious problem with this instruction is that it locates the relevant source of knowledge
undergirding its point in ‘ordinary human experience’ rather than psychology or social-science
research. It basically tells the jury members that if they have found in their ordinary experience
that identifying people of other races can be harder, then they may consider that experience
in their evaluation of the evidence in the case. But what if this is not the perceived experience
of the jurors? (ibid).
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the unconscious memory processes that produce misidentifications. In a recent
criminal trial, J. Don Read made precisely this point in expert testimony that was
ultimately excluded because its subject matter was within the ken: “They respond
to things that are, in a sense, outside of their awareness. How do I know? Because
we can do the studies and demonstrate that they choose people at higher rates
when you’ve made these manipulations.”98
The irony is that the eyewitness identifications themselves are only admissible
because they are made unconsciously;99 courts recognize the unconscious processes
that underlie identifications when exempting them from general bar on opinion
evidence, but they then lose track of this insight when excluding experts from
opining on those identifications. That is to say, the rule that permits eyewitness
identifications—the lay opinion rule—recognizes that the source of eyewitness
identifications is unconscious and non-verbalizable cognitive processes. Thus,
witnesses may give their opinion (e.g., “he’s the guy I saw robbing the bank”)—
the verbalizable outcome of unconscious processes —rather than providing the
facts that underlie that opinion—the unconscious processes. In the leading
lay opinion case, Justice Dickson, as he then was, gave precisely this rationale
for the rule: Lay opinion is permissible when it is made “without conscious
ratiocination.”100 In the context of eyewitness experts, courts have recognized
the difficulty this presents: “While the circumstances surrounding the witness’s
identification can be subject to scrutiny in cross-examination, many of the more
subjective processes that have led to it are impossible to expose in this fashion.”101
Courts, however, seem to lose track of these insights when deciding whether to
admit experts to opine on eyewitness identifications.

98. R v Clark, 2016 ABCA 72 (Trial transcript), online: <osf.io/sed4n> at 244 [Clark, ABQB].
99. Graat v R, [1982] 2 SCR 819 at para 52, 144 DLR (3d) 267 [Graat]. See also Chin, Tomiska
& Li, supra note 31.
100. Graat, supra note 99. See also Elwin v Nova Scotia Home for Coloured Children, 2013 NSSC
196 at para 88, 332 NBR (2d) 35. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court also couched the rule in
terms of lack of consciousness: “Put another way, a witness may give an opinion where the
facts upon which the opinion is based are assessed on a subconscious level” (ibid).
101. R v Miaponoose, 30 OR (3d) 419 at para 11, 32 WCB (2d) 161. See also Kent
Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding
Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52:2
Crim LQ 210 at 216.
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The role of unconscious processes leading to misidentifications in Canada
was made evident in the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow.102 In the
inquiry that followed Sophonow’s release, Justice Cory highlighted the role of
unconscious transference in the wrongful conviction. One of the Crown’s key
witnesses did not initially select Sophonow out of the lineup but did select him
in a subsequent lineup after seeing him in the newspaper.103 In fact, Justice Cory
relied heavily on Elizabeth Loftus’s research when coming to his conclusion about
the proper role of eyewitness memory experts in the courtroom:
I would recommend that judges consider favourably and readily admit properly
qualified expert evidence pertaining to eyewitness identification. This is certainly not
junk science. Careful studies have been made with regard to memory and its effect
upon eyewitness identification. Jurors would benefit from the studies and learning of
experts in this field.104

Justice Cory recommended that trial judges “readily admit” eyewitness
memory experts over fifteen years ago. As a testament to the power of unconscious
neglect, only one reported trial decision has adopted Justice Cory’s advice.105
Instead, McIntosh is still widely followed. In R v Perlett, for example, the Court
of Appeal for Ontario excluded Elizabeth Loftus’s testimony, which would have
explained the effect of extreme stress (from a home invasion) on memory.106 The
court followed McIntosh, deciding that stress and memory were “within jurors’
normal experience.”107 The court made this finding in spite of research directed
to them by Loftus showing that nearly 50 per cent of Americans laboured
under the myth that stressful events are better remembered than non-stressful

102. Manitoba, Department of Justice, “The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow”
(Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 2010), online: <digitalcollection.gov.mb.ca/awweb/
pdfopener?smd=1&did=12713&md=1> [Manitoba, DOJ]. See also the role of eyewitness
identification in the wrongful conviction of Leighton Hay, R v Hay, 2013 SCC 61, [2013] 3
SCR 694; Robert Baltovich, R v Baltovich (2004), 73 OR (3d) 481, 65 WCB (2d) 397 (CA)
[Baltovich]; Anthony Hanemaayer, R v Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580, 78 WCB (2d) 399;
Réjean Hinse, R v Hinse (1994), 64 QAC 53, 24 WCB (2d) 130; and Romeo Phillion, see R
v Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, 65 CR (6th) 255 [Phillion, ONCA]. There may be fewer (as a
proportion) confirmed cases of wrongful convictions based on eyewitness identifications in
Canada as compared to the United States because sexual offences carry shorter sentences in
Canada, thus leaving less time for the exoneration process.
103. Manitoba, DOJ, supra note 102 at 59.
104. Ibid at 18 [emphasis added].
105. R v Henderson, 2009 MBQB 101, 239 Man R (2d) 69.
106. R v Perlett (2006), 82 OR (3d) 89 at para 95, 71 WCB (2d) 210 (CA).
107. Ibid at para 108.
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ones.108 In 2013, a differently constituted panel of the Court of Appeal followed
McIntosh and excluded expert evidence about unconscious transference and other
memory processes.109
E.

FALSE CONFESSIONS AND MR. BIG OPERATIONS

In a popular episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, the Cardassian Gul
Madred attempts to demonstrate mastery over his prisoner, Captain Jean-Luc
Picard, by forcing him to report a patently false claim: that there are five spotlights
shining on him when there are only four. Jean-Luc withstands sleep-withdrawal,
promises of numerous benefits, and the lie that his crew has been killed, and
steadfastly refuses to adopt Madred’s narrative. Finally, Jean-Luc appears to
waiver when Madred offers him a final bargain of “[a] life of ease... of reflection
and intellectual challenge,”110 as opposed to life in prison. The only catch: Picard
must say there are five lights. At that moment, Cardassian forces above Madred’s
head order Picard’s release. Reflecting on these moments, Picard and a colleague
share the following conversation:
One thing I didn’t put in my report... at the very end, he offered me a choice...
between a life of comfort... or more torture... all I had to do was say there were five
lights.
You didn’t say it...
No... but I was going to. I was ready to tell him anything he wanted... anything at
all. But more than that, I was beginning to believe there were five lights.111

This description of Jean-Luc’s plight evokes comparisons to the Milgram
experiments and Loewenstein’s interpretation of them. Jean-Luc, like the
participants in Milgram’s studies, did not suffer a mental disorder; there was
no dispositional force at play. In fact, he was one of Star Fleet’s finest officers.
Yet, just as 65 per cent of Milgram’s participants administered the highest shock
possible, even Picard wavered under pressure. Similarly, under the intense visceral
pressures of interrogation, intelligent adults will make false self-incriminatory
108. Ibid at para 103. One such study is Richard S Schmechel et al, “Beyond The Ken? Testing
Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence” (2006) 46:2 Jurimetrics 177.
Indeed, stress has a reliable negative impact on memory in most cases. For a recent review, see
Grant S Shields et al, “The Effects of Acute Stress on Episodic Memory: A Meta-Analysis and
Integrative Review” (2017) 143:6 Psychological Bulletin 636.
109. Frimpong, supra note 90 at paras 23-28.
110. Frank Abatemarco, “Chain of Command, Part II” Star Trek: The Next Generation, online:
<www.st-minutiae.com/resources/scripts/237.txt>.
111. Ibid [emphasis added].

Chin, Crozier, Rethinking the Ken 649

statements about even the most heinous crimes. Demonstrating this outwardly
counterintuitive phenomenon, Brandon Garrett examined 250 wrongful
convictions in the United States in which the accused was exonerated by DNA
evidence. Of these 250 miscarriages of justice, forty involved false confessions.112
Only four of those exonerees brought expert evidence about their confession at
trial, and where brought, this evidence was largely disregarded.113
As we discuss above in Part I(C), research into false confessions has found
that they are driven by both situation and disposition.114 In Garrett’s US study,
he described a host of situational factors, including verbal abuse and other
powerful inducements.115 As for disposition, 65 per cent of those who gave
false confessions were mentally disabled, underage, or both.116 In Canada, the
confession in R v Unger revealed a similar pattern.117 Kyle Unger gave a confession
after being subjected to a undercover police tactic known as a Mr. Big operation
(described below in this Part) in which he was promised a lucrative position in a
fictional organized crime group. Unger was young (approximately twenty) and
poor; the gang’s inducements were difficult to turn down.118 About twelve years
later, DNA evidence called the conviction into doubt and the ministerial review
process began.119 The Crown ultimately withdrew the charges.
Despite these troubling findings, Canadian courts almost always find that
situational forces bearing on the reliability of a confession are within the ken.120
In doing so, their reasoning processes are remarkably similar to those found in
McIntosh; they draw a distinction between admissible evidence about a mental
disorder suffered by the accused (i.e., disposition) and inadmissible evidence about
the situation in which the confession was made. In R v Dietrich, for instance,
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Garrett, “Substance,” supra note 21 at 1060.
Ibid at 1102-1106.
See the sources in supra notes 60-65.
Garrett, “Substance,” supra note 21 at 1065-66.
Ibid at 1064-65.
(1993), 85 Man R (2d) 284, 20 WCB (2d) 395 (MB CA).
Saul M Kassin et al, “Police-Induced Confessions, Risk Factors, and Recommendations:
Looking Ahead” 34:1 Law & Hum Behaviour 49 at 50.
119. R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52 para 62, [2014] 2 SCR 544 [Hart].
120. For a discussion of false confessions in the Canadian context, see Brian L Cutler, Keith
A Findley & Timothy E Moore, “Interrogations and False Confessions: A Psychological
Perspective” (2014) 18:2 Can Crim L Rev 153; Timothy E Moore & C Lindsay
Fitzsimmons, “Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid Technique” (2011) 57:4
Crim LQ 509; Moore & Wasser, supra note 3. For its role in false confessions, see Bruce
MacFarlane, “Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice System” (2006) 31:3
Man LJ 403 at 472-78.
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the Court of Appeal for Ontario found the testimony of three psychiatrists
was properly admissible.121 Those psychiatrists testified that the accused had “a
psychopathic personality and that both false confessions and the truth would
be consistent with his personality.”122 As we now describe, the outcome is very
different when the expert would be called to explain the situational, visceral
factors that contribute to false confessions.
The SCC’s foundational confessions case, R v Oickle, seemed to presage the
admissibility of expert evidence about visceral factors.123 Expert evidence was not
at issue in Oickle. Rather, the Court enunciated the current rule for the admission
of confessions, which centres on voluntariness.124 In its inquiry, however, the
Court acknowledged a vast collection of research and literature describing the
situational and dispositional forces that result in false confessions.125 Writing
for the majority, Justice Iacobucci made several important observations about
false confessions. He accepted that they occur frequently.126 He also remarked
that they are “counterintuitive” because lay people struggle to understand why
someone would confess to a crime he or she did not commit.127 Justice Iacobucci
then surveyed a leading taxonomy for false confessions and suggested that a
variety of situational and dispositional factors produce false confessions.128
With strong language regarding both the significance and widespread
misunderstanding of false confessions among triers of fact, Oickle appeared to
open the door for expert evidence regarding the reliability of confessions. For
instance, Gary Trotter (now a Justice of the Court of Appeal for Ontario) predicted
that post-Oickle, such evidence should meet Mohan’s necessity requirement:

121. R v Dietrich (1970), [1970] 3 OR 725 at paras 39-56, 11 CRNS 22.
122. Ibid at para 39. The Ontario Supreme Court in R v Harley followed this view. See R v Harley
(1985), 16 WCB 78, 1985 CarswellOnt 2477 (WL Can) (SC).
123. R v Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 SCR 3 [Oickle].
124. Ibid at para 47.
125. The accused in Oickle confessed to several instances of arson. His confession, however, did
not come easily; the police misled him about the accuracy of a polygraph that he failed and
threatened to investigate his girlfriend should he not confess. Justice Iacobucci, writing
for the majority, enunciated a new common law confessions rule, couching the analysis in
whether the confession was involuntary and thus unreliable (see ibid at paras 81-84, 94-103).
Based on this new test, Oickle’s confession was voluntary and thus admissible (ibid at para
72). Justice Arbour, in dissent, agreed with the majority’s statement of the law. However, she
found that the police tactics ran afoul the confessions rule, and thus Oickle’s confession was
involuntary (ibid at paras 106-42).
126. Ibid at para 35.
127. Ibid at para 34.
128. Ibid at paras 38-44.
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After Oickle, the necessity threshold should be met for expert evidence on false
confessions. … It is a counter-intuitive proposition. It suggests an unusual person,
an unusual scenario, or perhaps both. Without assistance in unraveling this issue, the
conduct of the accused may be beguiling to a juror in the same way as the battered
woman who does not leave her abuser.129

Importantly, Trotter seemed to place disposition (“an unusual person”) and
situation (“an unusual scenario”) on the same footing. His prediction, however,
was not borne out by the case law.
R v Phillion represented one such opportunity to admit expert evidence
about false confessions but was ultimately decided on other grounds.130 Phillion
was referred to the Court of Appeal for Ontario as a possible miscarriage of
justice.131 The conviction was based on an eyewitness identification and recanted
confession.132 At the reference, the defence tendered the expert evidence of two
psychologists, who opined that a combination of the situation and Phillion’s
distinctive personality traits cast doubt on his confession.133 The Court of Appeal
decided the expert evidence was not fresh evidence because similar evidence
had been admitted at trial.134 Still, the court issued dispositionist dicta saying
that the personality evidence should be admissible: “in cases such as this where
the reliability of a confession is in issue, expert evidence regarding an accused’s
personality traits that is relevant to and probative of the issue will be admissible.”135
Mr. Phillion succeeded on other grounds, and his case is now considered an
instance of wrongful conviction based on faulty eyewitness identification and
false confession.136

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Trotter, supra note 3 at 193 [emphasis added].
Phillion, ONCA, supra note 102.
Ibid at paras 9, 45-47.
Phillion v R (1977), [1978] 1 SCR 18, 74 DLR (3d) 136.
Phillion, ONCA, supra note 102 at paras 202-207.
Ibid at paras 236-37.
Ibid at para 218.
“Introduction: The Unsolved Murder of Leopold Roy,” Innocence Canada, online: <www.
innocencecanada.com/exonerations/romeo-phillion>. The same line was drawn in R v
Leslie, 2008 ONCJ 666, 87 WCB (2d) 509. The court expressly distinguished the allowable
expert testimony about mental disorder from Dietrich. It disallowed expert evidence from
psychologist Timothy Moore, characterizing it as common sense drawn from human
experience: “What Dr. Moore is describing, essentially, is a scenario which inherently be
characterized as a combination of threats, inducements and oppressive circumstances. That
is not the domain of specialized knowledge but, rather, a confirmation that one must assess
with common sense and human experience” (ibid at para 10).
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R v Pearce, a 2014 decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, drew a
bright line between inadmissible situational factors and admissible dispositional
characteristics.137 The accused in Pearce contacted the police to offer assistance in a
murder case that had gone cold. After an interview and a polygraph examination,
he was cleared as a suspect. He then came forward yet again and, after an
extensive interrogation, confessed to the murder.138 Pearce later contended that
the confession was false. He was upset and suicidal because he had just been
outed as homosexual and had learned he might have AIDS, he had been abusing
painkillers, and the police had coerced him into making the confession.139
In support of its false confession theory, the defence tendered the evidence of two
expert psychologists who opined on both dispositional and situational factors.
The dispositional testimony—the results of a personality test given to
Pearce—was inadmissible because it was unreliable but not because it was
unnecessary.140 The situational evidence was disallowed because it was unnecessary
and the expert was not impartial.141 As to necessity, the Court of Appeal held that
the situational factors were well within the jury’s ken:
The appellant said when he confessed he was emotionally upset to the point of being
suicidal because his homosexuality had been revealed and he was fearful he may
have AIDS. Such stress was transitory in nature and not a distinctive behaviourial
characteristic outside the experience and knowledge of the jury.142

The experiences in Pearce and the cases that proceeded it represent a “natural
experiment” testing whether Canadian courts are indeed dispositionist. In these
cases, expert evidence about the reliability of a confession is introduced as both
dispositional and situational. The results are clear: Courts, without expressly
remarking on the distinction they are making, prefer the dispositional evidence.
The same pattern holds in the US case law.143
Issues of false confessions do not only arise in conventional police
interrogations. Rather, many of the same visceral factors are at play when suspects
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Pearce, supra note 72.
Ibid at paras 7-30, 139.
Ibid at paras 26-28.
Ibid at para 88.
Ibid at paras 38-40, 91-98.
Ibid at para 85.
See People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106 (2012) (mirrors Pearce). The American Psychological
Association, in its amicus curiae brief, remarked on the illogical distinction between
admissible dispositionist evidence and inadmissible situational evidence. See People v
Kowalski, 492 Mich 106 (2012) (Brief of the American Psychological Association in Support
of Appellant), online: www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/kowalski.pdf> at 18.
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confess to undercover officers as part of an investigative tactic known as a Mr.
Big operation.144 In these operations, a suspect is approached by undercover
officers and offered to carry out some small criminal jobs for a fictional criminal
organization. As the charade progresses, the suspect moves up the ladder in the
organization. This suspect, often someone of limited means and social contacts,
is lavished with expensive gifts, dinners, flights across the country, and friendship.
Along the way, he or she may be shown examples of other members who disobey
or mislead the organization and suffer bodily harm as a result. It all culminates in
a meeting with the titular Mr. Big. At this point, Mr. Big may ask the suspect to
admit any crimes he or she has committed because they may be a liability to the
organization. Alternatively, Mr. Big may say he has evidence of a crime and the
suspect should admit it as an indication of loyalty.145
Mr. Big stings engage incredible situational pressures. In fact, the SCC
recently acknowledged the psychological literature concerning these forces in
enunciating a new exclusionary rule for Mr. Big confessions.146 In R v Hart, the
Court held that such confessions are presumptively inadmissible, with the onus
on the Crown to demonstrate that their probative value exceeds their prejudice.147
One source of prejudice comes from the visceral factors of fear and authority
(as in the Milgram study).148 R v Orr149 provides an example of such pressures and
courts’ willingness to disregard them. In that case, the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia drew an analogy between the plight of human trafficking victims
and those subject to Mr. Big stings. The court said that expert evidence about
both are unnecessary because “[t]here is persuasive authority for the proposition
that ordinary, fair-minded members of Canadian juries are capable of weighing
common motivations and basic human emotions such as fear of reprisal and

144. For a review of the Mr. Big strategy, see Hart, supra note 119 at paras 56-62; R v Osmar,
2007 ONCA 50 at paras 1-5, 84 OR (3d) 321 [Osmar]; Timothy E Moore, Peter Copeland
& Regina A Schuller, “Deceit, Betrayal and the Search for Truth: Legal and Psychological
Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009) 55:3 Crim LQ 348 at 351-53. In Australia, see
Tofilau v R, [2007] HCA 39, 231 CLR 396.
145. Hart, supra note 119 at para 60.
146. Ibid at paras 68-77.
147. Ibid at paras 84-118.
148. See Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra note 144 at 378-93 (Moore, Copeland and Schuller
lucidly employ a psychological analysis to describe the dangers the dispositionism in
evaluating Mr. Big confessions).
149. 2015 BCCA 88, 120 WCB (2d) 51.
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dependence.”150 In other words, the situational forces at play in human trafficking
and elaborate police stings are both within the ken.
Mr. Big stings also trigger the intense “need to belong” and the corresponding
fear of alienation. Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary studied this need, finding it
can be as strong as many physiological needs and can cause intense emotional
pain because humans are inherently social animals.151 This force was at play
in Hart itself: The suspect, at the behest of the undercover officers, became
estranged from his wife.152 He thus relied on his new ‘friends’ as his only source of
social contact.153 This is yet another social situational force that a jury is likely to
underestimate due to the dispositionist heuristic that only guilty people confess.154
Despite the acknowledgement in Hart that Mr. Big confessions are inherently
unreliable, there is little reason to think expert evidence about these confessions
will be permitted any time soon. Appellate decisions have consistently held that
the psychological forces that impact the reliability of a Mr. Big confession are
within the trier of fact’s ken.155 And while the Hart doctrine is a step in the right
direction for excluding unreliable confessions, it still represents a high bar.156
Compounding this problem (and unlike with eyewitness memory), there are
still no standard judicial instructions designed to educate the trier of fact about
visceral forces that cause false confessions. In the following Part, we outline our
recommendation for an approach to unreliable Crown evidence. Reflecting on the
above discussion, the following Part combines exclusionary rules with measures
designed to educate the trier of fact about the situational and unconscious forces
they are constitutionally inclined to neglect.

150. Ibid at para 73. The court in Orr also relied on McIntosh for the general notion that the
behavioural sciences are not beyond the ken (ibid at para 67).
151. Roy F Baumeister & Mark R Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal
Attachment as a Fundamental Human Motivation” (1995) 117:3 Psychological Bulletin 497.
152. Hart, supra note 119 at paras 136-38.
153. The Supreme Court ultimately found Hart’s confession was inadmissible for a variety of
reasons, including the social alienation factor. See ibid at paras 127-47.
154. Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra note 144 at 383-84.
155. Osmar, supra note 144; R v Bonisteel, 2008 BCCA 344, 79 WCB (2d) 506; Jeanvenne,
supra note 90. The court in Jeanvenne relied on McIntosh for the notion that courts should
be reluctant in “abdicating the jury’s fact finding responsibilities to experts in the field of
behavioural sciences” (ibid at para 27). This may further reinforce the degree to which the
exclusion of experts in these areas is driven by the same psychological misapprehensions.
156. See text accompanying infra note 201.
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III. COUNTERING UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECT AND
DISPOSITIONISM
We have argued that courts frequently over-apply Mohan’s necessity requirement
because they misunderstand the psychology of eyewitness memory and
confessions; these courts undervalue the assistance experts offer in explaining
the situational and unconscious processes that produce mistaken identifications
and false confessions. This does not mean, however, that admitting an expert
will always be the appropriate “procedural corrective.”157 Indeed, experts carry
a cost, both in terms of court time and any fee the expert may charge.158
Moreover, framework (as opposed to diagnostic) evidence is less likely to vary
on a case-by-case basis, which suggests that reforms focused on enhanced judicial
instructions and education may be of particular value. Still, a more scientifically
informed conceptualization of the fact-trier’s ken informs how courts should
regulate eyewitness and confession evidence.159
157. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 278.
158. Moreover, there is no consensus in the psychological literature regarding whether judges or
experts are more effective at educating the jury about eyewitness memory issues. For example,
some research finds that experts are effective. See Brian L Cutler, Hedy R Dexter & Steven
D Penrod, “Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis” (1989) 7:2
Behav Sci & L 215. Other research finds that judicial instructions are ineffective. See Edith
Greene, “Judge’s Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision” (1988) 18:3
J Applied Psychol 252. However, a recent, well-designed study found no difference between
the two safeguards. See Kristy A Martire & Richard I Kemp, “The Impact of Eyewitness
Expert Evidence and Judicial Instruction on Juror Ability to Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony”
(2009) 33:3 Law & Hum Behavior 225. Still, this area has not reached a consensus, and
there may be circumstances—likely those where several complicated memory phenomena are
engaged—where expert evidence is preferable. And, even in studies that found no ultimate
effect on verdict, more sensitive measures like memory for the testimony or instructions
benefited from expert evidence (ibid at 231). Note also that the efficacy of expert evidence
is highly plausible. See D(D), supra note 71 at para 31. Chief Justice McLachlin, in dissent,
suggested that jurors would benefit from understanding how underlying psychological
processes work. For a similar point, see Copeland, supra note 3 at 203 (noting that “[j]
urors are much more likely to be sensitive to the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence if they understand how and why these factors affect reliability”). For
a review, see Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 297-309; Fiona Leverick, “Jury Instructions on
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: A Re-Evaluation” (2016) 49:3 Creighton L Rev 555.
159. For other well-considered reform recommendations, see Roach, supra note 101; Angela
Baxter, “Identification Evidence in Canada: Problems and a Potential Solution” (2007)
52:2 Crim LQ 175.
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Besides unconscious neglect and dispositionism, other cognitive biases render
eyewitness and recanted evidence difficult for the trial judge to manage. For
instance, Michael Saks and Barbara Spellman recently noted that judges labour
under what psychologists call the “curse of knowledge.”160 In other words, judges
face understandable difficulty in the meta-cognitive task of placing themselves in
the mind of the jury because the judges have a great deal more experience with
eyewitness identifications and false confessions. As a result, they can be expected
to overestimate the jury’s understanding of these issues. By similar processes,
they are also inclined to overestimate their own ability to explain these complex
phenomena to juries.161
In light of unconscious neglect, dispositionism, and the curse of knowledge,
an improved system for managing eyewitness identifications and confessions
should be more specific and directive. It should require that trial judges engage
with the factors that produce unreliable identifications and confessions.
Moreover, the same biases underlie both of these forms of evidence. Therefore,
the lessons gleaned from unreliable eyewitnesses may inform the confessions
doctrine and vice versa.
As we describe above in Part II(B), the SCC in Hart recently developed
a new procedure for admitting Mr. Big confessions. The Court rendered them
presumptively inadmissible, with the onus on the Crown to demonstrate the
confessions’ reliability. Similarly, in Oickle, the Court confirmed that traditional
police-induced confessions should be excluded if there is a reasonable doubt about
their voluntariness.162 There is no reason why a similar exclusionary mechanism
should not exist in response to eyewitness identifications,163 which are also
remarkably prejudicial because of their unconscious and situational character.164
But, while the responses to unreliable confessions in Oickle and Hart
represent rational responses, they still allow evidence that the factfinder is
predisposed to misunderstand to be admitted. This suggests there is still a role for
160. Saks & Spellman, supra note 24 at 18.
161. David Dunning, Chip Heath & Jerry M Suls, “Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for
Health, Education, and the Workplace” (2004) 5:3 Psychological Sci in Pub Interest 69.
162. Oickle, supra note 123 at para 68.
163. State v Henderson, supra note 44.
164. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 321-26 (making a similar argument for a more coherent
approach to unreliable Crown evidence). However, as we describe below in this Part,
we would not make all eyewitness identifications prima facie inadmissible. There are many
reasons to distinguish between Mr. Big confessions and eyewitness identifications, including
the sheer force of situational and unconscious pressures in Mr. Big confessions, the legal
system’s (in)tolerance for oppressive investigative tactics, and the sheer number of cases
including eyewitness identification evidence.
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educative measures in some cases. For instance, in Oickle itself, the accused faced
intense situational pressures to confess.165 The majority and dissent disagreed over
whether the confession was voluntary. If there can be reasonable disagreement
about the mere voluntariness of a confession, it stands to reason that the jury
should be thoroughly educated about the psychological forces that could have
rendered the confession unreliable but voluntary. There are, however, no standard
jury instructions in such circumstances.166
In the remainder of this Part, we provide two pragmatic suggestions for
how the Canadian common law of evidence should evolve. First, we discuss a
doctrine recently developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey v
Henderson.167 In Henderson, the court empowered a special master to hear evidence
about eyewitness memory from several leading psychologists. The court accepted
the master’s findings and devised a pre-trial procedure to consider the eyewitness
identification factors at issue and potentially to exclude the identification. This
doctrine—developed to reflect the science of memory—is well-suited to regulate
evidence that courts are inclined to underestimate. Second, we suggest that
Canadian courts more willingly admit expert evidence about false confessions.
Henderson represents one of the most rigorous common law approaches
to the problem of unreliable eyewitness identifications to date. To obtain a
Henderson pre-trial hearing, the initial onus is on the accused to demonstrate
some evidence of suggestion in the identification.168 Then, in the pre-trial
hearing, the prosecution must establish the reliability of the identification.
As part of this inquiry, the trial judge is directed to consider a non-exhaustive
list of system and estimator factors.169 If the trial judge finds that there is a “very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,”170 he or she must suppress
the identification. Even if the identification is admissible, the Henderson court
prescribed extensive judicial instructions that drill down into each factor that was
engaged.171 These instructions are to be given regardless of whether the eyewitness

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Oickle, supra note 123 at paras 6-10.
Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 273-74.
State v Henderson, supra note 44.
Ibid at 922-24.
Ibid at 920-22. Recall that estimator factors are situational factors outside the investigator’s
control, like cross-racial identification. System factors are controllable, like the administration
of the lineup. See text accompanying supra notes 53-54.
170. State v Henderson, supra note 44 at 920.
171. Ibid at 925-27.
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issue seems common sense.172 Further, instructions may be given during the trial
to educate the jury on key eyewitness issues as they emerge.173
In the face of psychological processes that courts regularly underestimate and
misunderstand, the more specific and directive Henderson procedure presents an
advantage.174 Notably, the psychology of eyewitness memory is no longer an issue
the court may disregard; rather, the trial judge must (as in the current confessions
regime) provide an express holding in many cases. The Henderson court made
this same point, noting that “estimator variables would no longer be ignored.”175
In Canada, the only realistic means for excluding an eyewitness identification is
under the trial judge’s highly discretionary power to exclude evidence when its
risk of prejudice outweighs its probative value.176 This is typically reserved for
highly prejudicial and nearly valueless in-dock identifications.177 Adopting an
exclusionary rule based on defined factors and principles aligns the eyewitness
rules with the development of similar rules in Oickle and Hart.
A more concrete eyewitness regime may also provide efficiencies. For instance,
the spectre of an inadmissible identification would encourage police to follow
guidelines rigorously for extracting identifications (e.g., by using double-blind
procedures and constructing lineups using photographs of individuals similar
to the description provided by witnesses).178 It can be easy to take shortcuts in
the course of an investigation. Stronger rules (or any rules, for that matter) may
help deter such behaviour and may lead to fewer issues at trial as well as less

172. Ibid at 924-25 (noting that “[e]ven with matters that may be considered intuitive, courts
provide focused jury instructions” (ibid at 924)).
173. Ibid at 924.
174. For a similar suggestion, see Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 321-23.
175. State v Henderson, supra note 44 at 922.
176. Baxter, supra note 159 at 184-89.
177. Ibid. But, note that one serious difficulty with asking trial judges to exclude unreliable
identifications is that they may be ill-equipped to make that determination. Indeed, even
expert psychologists cannot accurately opine on the reliability of a particular identification.
See Mnookin, supra note 97 at 1828-36.
178. For instance, guidelines were not followed in R v Clark because the identification was not
double-bind. See R v Clark, 2016 ABCA 72 at para 42, 128 WCB (2d) 585 [Clark, ABCA].
The Henderson court suggested that deterring improper police conduct is an important role
for rules that regulate the admission of eyewitness identifications. See State v Henderson, supra
note 44 at 919.
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emphasis on a judge’s instructions to the jury, which research finds can often
be ineffective.179
Moreover, the Canadian eyewitness jurisprudence is replete with trial
decisions overturned and retrials ordered for deficient jury instructions.180 While
useful model instructions are available,181 and while courts have been warned to
use specific and thorough instructions,182 trial judges retain considerable discretion
in crafting their instructions (and this problem is even greater in bench trials,
as we discuss later in this Part). In R v Richards, for instance, the Court of Appeal
for Ontario ordered a new trial, in part, because the trial judge failed to canvass
sufficiently the dangers of cross-racial misidentifications in his instructions.183
Under Henderson, that would have been required at first instance.184 Again,
judges may fail to bring home the frailty of eyewitness memory because of
unconscious neglect. It may also be difficult for them to remove themselves from
their own view of the case. In R v Baltovich, for instance, insufficient instructions
about eyewitness memory coincided with a charge that “as a whole, … unduly
promoted the case for the Crown and effectively ignored and denigrated the case
for the defence.”185 As noted in the beginning of this Part, judicial education
programs may wish to highlight the often-counterintuitive forces that render
eyewitness identifications unreliable.
This brings us to expert evidence, a measure that may also relieve some
pressure from the trial judge’s instructions. Unlike with its directions regarding
pre-trial hearings and jury charges, the Henderson court left the admission of
expert witnesses as a discretionary measure. Here, it is important to note that
Canadian and US courts substantially diverge in their admission of eyewitness
179. See the sources in supra note 158. See also Chantelle M Baguley, Blake M McKimmie &
Barbara M Masser, “Deconstructing the Simplification of Jury Instructions: How Simplifying
the Features of Complexity Affects Jurors’ Application of Instructions” (2017) 41:3 Law &
Hum Behavior 284.
180. R v Hibbert (1996), 128 WAC 277 at para 52, 78 BCAC 277; R v Richards (2004),
70 OR (3d) 737, 62 WCB (2d) 11 (CA) [Richards]; Baltovich, supra note 102 at paras
77-83; R v Tebo (2003), 57 WCB (2d) 588 at para 19, 175 CCC (3d) 116 (CA);
R v Brown, 2007 ONCA 71 at para 19, 72 WCB (2d) 313; R c Proulx (1992), 76 CCC
(3d) 316 at paras 46-155, [1992] RJQ 2047 (CA); R v Brand (1995), 27 WCB (2d) 203 at
para 7, 80 OAC 396.
181. National Judicial Institute, “Model Jury Instructions” (2014), online: <www.nji-inm.ca/
index.cfm/publications/model-jury-instructions> [NJI].
182. R v Canning, [1986] 1 SCR 991, 30 DLR (4th) 767.
183. Richards, supra note 180 at para 32.
184. State v Henderson, supra note 44 at 926.
185. Baltovich, supra note 102 at para 113.
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memory experts. In the United States, courts are increasingly likely to admit such
experts.186 However, as we reviewed in Part II(A,) McIntosh represents a de facto
bar to such evidence in Canada.
We suggest that Canadian courts cautiously admit expert evidence about
unreliable identifications. In making this decision, courts may consider several
questions concerning the case against the accused. For instance, are issues of
eyewitness identification central to the case?187 If the case against the accused
hinges on an identification, then the court may wish to ensure the fact-trier is
thoroughly informed about the psychological issues at play. Further, are any aspects
of the identification especially vulnerable to misunderstandings about human
memory? Here, courts can leverage a large body of research on misconceptions
about eyewitness memory. This research indicates which aspects of memory are
particularly counterintuitive due to their unconscious and situational character.
For example, one large meta-analysis (a statistical summary of several other
studies) found that 50 per cent of potential jurors are mistaken about the effect
of race on face memory.188
If an identification rests on one or more of these especially powerful
misconceptions, it may be a particularly appropriate case for expert evidence.189
More generally, there is reason to believe that experts may be more effective than
judges at conveying psychological information. Generally, listeners are sensitive
186. Saks & Spellman, supra note 24 at 121. For a review of the US position, see Henry F
Fradella, “Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Testimony” (2007) 2:1 Fed Cts L Rev 1.
187. See e.g. Paciocco, supra note 3 at 344. Paciocco observes that “[w]hen judging ‘necessity’,
focus should not be solely on the subject-matter of the opinion, per se, nor solely on the
knowledge of the trier of fact. Necessity should be judged in light of the particular evidence
and circumstances of the case” (ibid). See also Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, “A Contextual
Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic Science and Medical Evidence” (2011)
61:3 UTLJ 343 at 363.
188. Sarah Desmarais & J Don Read, “After 30 Years, What Do We Know about What Jurors
Know? A Meta-Analytic Review of Lay Knowledge Regarding Eyewitness Factors” (2011)
35:3 Law & Hum Behavior 200 at 203.
189. Such a system would also assist when judicial instructions are already likely to be long and
complicated. Recent research finds that such instructions are ineffective. Baguley, McKimmie
& Masser, supra note 179. For a novel solution to the challenge of admitting expert evidence
in a way that is not overly burdensome on the trial process, see Mnookin, supra note 97.
Mnookin suggests that expert evidence “modules” can be prepared by a neutral body and
played in trials when the relevant issue arises. For instance, if the case involves a holdup with
a weapon, the trial judge may play a video of an expert psychologist opining on the research
demonstrating that this factor impairs eyewitness memory. Similarly, cross-examination
modules could also be presented.
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to the person delivering a message and may take the word of a psychological
scientist more seriously.190 Then Chief Justice McLachlin, dissenting in R v D(D),
noted that jurors may benefit from hearing about the science behind psychological
phenomena and that experts are better placed than judges at conveying that
information.191 We are cognizant of the fact that mock-trial research has been
inconclusive in determining whether expert testimony on eyewitness memory
adds value. Still, very few studies have been conducted, and they have only
explored a limited number of memory misconceptions that experts would opine
on.192 Moreover, there is reason to believe that some misconceptions are more
powerful than others.
A Henderson-inspired regime also assuages some of the issues that arise from
bench trials. For instance, in R v Clark, the Court of Appeal for Alberta upheld a
trial judge’s decision to exclude an expert psychologist.193 The trial judge reasoned
that the expert was unnecessary because the judge’s own knowledge was sufficient.
He noted that he had been a lawyer for thirty-seven years and had taken several
courses about the assessment of witnesses.194 In cases like Clark, accused parties
may have justified concerns about the trial judges’ knowledge of psychological
research, especially in light of the fact that humans are constitutionally inclined
to discount very real situational and unconscious forces. The accused in Clark at
least had access to an expert who outlined the science for the trial judge in a voir
dire, thus guaranteeing some part of the science was heard. In many cases, the
accused does not even have that safeguard.
Had a Henderson hearing been available in Clark, the trial judge would
have been directed to consider all of the psychological factors at play because
the identification contained elements of suggestion. Indeed, when Clark was
identified, the witness twice went through a photograph lineup without identifying
him. He only made the identification when the officer drew his attention to
190. See Richard E Petty & John T Cacioppo, Communication and Persuasion: Central and
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012);
Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: Harper Collins,
2007) at 208-36.
191. D(D), supra note 71 at para 31. Chief Justice McLachlin (dissenting) states:
The expert testified not only that many children do not report abuse immediately, but also
went on to discuss the reasons why children may delay, based on the scientific literature. This
additional information might reasonably have assisted the jury in deciding what, if anything,
to infer from the delay, in a way that the proposed direction by the trial judge would not. If so,
the evidence remained necessary (ibid).

192. See the sources in supra note 158.
193. See the sources in supra note 179.
194. Clark, ABQB, supra note 98 at 330-31.
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Clark’s photograph.195 As a result, even if an expert had not been available, the
judge would have had to consider eyewitness memory research and expressly
rule on its applicability to the case. This is preferable to the current situation in
Canada in which an accused has no guarantee at all about the extent to which the
trial judge informed him or herself about the science of eyewitness memory.196
Regarding confessions, there are presently no standard National Judicial
Institute jury instructions to educate about the case factors that may have produced
a false confession.197 As a result, courts should consider admitting experts until
the institutional knowledge has caught up to the science. As recommended by
the SCC in two recent cases,198 this evidence may be narrowly circumscribed
by the trial judge to focus on the aspects of the confession the jury is likely
to misunderstand. This measure may save time and assuage the worry that the
expert will exceed his or her role and usurp the role of the trier of fact.
The plight of Mr. Big confessors is even more severe because the evidence
is not just inculpatory but also leverages the jury’s dispositional instincts in a
manner that puts the accused’s character into question.199 For instance, in R v
Worme, a confession was admitted through the new Hart doctrine. The context
to that admission was that prior to giving it, the accused was induced to engage
in twenty-nine (notionally illegal) operations with the Mr. Big organization.200
This would almost surely impact the jury’s ongoing evaluation of the case against
the accused. Expert testimony heard during the trial may inoculate against such
inferences in ways that instructions given at the end of the trial cannot.201

195. Clark, ABCA, supra note 178 at para 32.
196. R v Gough, 2013 ONCA 137 at paras 36-37, 105 WCB (2d) 672.
197. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 273-74; NJI, supra note 181. Those responsible for drafting any
such standard instructions may wish to take note of recent work demonstrating scientific
consensus in many areas of confessions research. See Saul M Kassin et al, “On the General
Acceptance of Confessions Research: Opinions of the Scientific Community” (2018) 73:1
Am Psychologist 63.
198. R v Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15 at paras 46-48, [2014] 1 SCR 272; R v Bingley, 2017 SCC 12 at
paras 16, 29, [2017] 1 SCR 170. For a review, see Helena Likwornik, “Overstepping and
Sidestepping: The Expert Evidence Dance” (2017) 35:4 Adv J 24.
199. Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra note 144; Hart, supra note 119 at paras 73-77.
200. R v Worme, 2016 ABCA 174 at para 7, 36 Alta LR (6th) 1. A re-trial was ordered in Worme
because the investigating officer testified that Mr. Big confessions tend to be pure and
truthful statements, and the trial judge did not allow him to be questioned on the fact that
he had been involved in a sting that resulted in a wrongful conviction.
201. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 273-74.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In studies spanning thousands of participants, researchers find that people possess
many deeply held misconceptions about how human psychology works.202
Despite these findings, trial judges regularly exclude psychological evidence
because they believe it is common sense. They assume that the unconscious and
situational character of eyewitness memory and induced confessions is common
sense and within their own experience and that of the jury. But this is simply not
the case; humans do not have conscious access to their unconscious mind and
thus consistently discount the situational pressures that impact their thoughts,
feelings, and behaviour.
In narrowing the ken to a more realistic model of what judges and jurors
understand about human nature, we are expanding the range of topics on which
experts should be admitted to opine. But that does mean that the floodgates
are open. Over the past two decades, the SCC has increasingly emphasized the
importance of gatekeeping invalid scientific evidence.203 And beyond scientific
validity itself, the Court recently confirmed that an expert’s partiality does not
merely go to weight but can be grounds to exclude the expert.204 Further, the
SCC has also emphasized the importance of carefully circumscribing the scope of
expert evidence and policing that scope.205 Thorough scrutiny of expert evidence’s
validity and impartiality provides a more scientifically sound way to keep the gate
against expert evidence about eyewitness memory and confessions. For instance,
in Pearce, the personality test used by one of the experts to determine if the
accused was prone to false confessions had not been scientifically validated.206
Further, issues of partiality arose in that case because the expert’s submissions
strayed from describing the science to advocacy.207 These reasons for excluding
evidence are far sounder than the mistaken belief that the factors that produce
false confessions are within the ken.
While it may be intimidating to confront long-held and deeply intuitive
misconceptions of the trier of fact’s ken, the benefits outweigh the disadvantages.
Most significantly, unconscious neglect and dispositionism account for what has
202. Desmarais & Read, supra note 188.
203. White Burgess, supra note 71 at para 20.
204. Ibid at para 40. But note that the Court established a high bar to exclude evidence
for partiality.
205. For a review, see Jason M Chin & Helena Likwornik, “R v Bingley and the Importance of
Scientifically Guided Legal Analysis” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 33.
206. Pearce, supra note 72 at para 88.
207. Ibid at paras 96-98.
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long been considered one of criminal law’s greatest dangers: the risk of wrongful
convictions. Those miscarriages of justice that have been identified—a number
that grossly underestimates the total amount that exist—regularly tell the tale of
a confident, but mistaken, eyewitness or a suspect seemingly acting against his or
her interest by confessing to a crime. Once we accept that the fact-trier’s ken is
narrower than we thought, the path forward becomes much clearer.

